Book 1. How can we know if Christianity is true? Book 2. Questions of God, man and the universe. Book 3 Questions about Jesus Christ.

A brief survey of events and movements from the first century to the present day provides the background for understanding the complexity of questions relating to the presence of Christians in the Middle East at the present time. Some of these issues affect all Christians, while others are specific to particular countries in the region. Given the steep decline in the numbers of Christians for a variety of reasons over the centuries, is it possible to have any optimism about their (...) future in the region? (shrink)

The capture of Mosul in Iraq by ISIS in June 2014 focused the world’s attention on Islamism, or political Islam. In addition to all the political issues faced by the rest of the world, Christians are faced with some special challenges and have not always responded with a single voice. If we are to think in a distinctively Christian way about Islamism and violence carried out in the name of Islam, what are the key questions that we need to be (...) asking? (shrink)

THE mind is the locus of various dispositions, of developed sources and motives of action, which are not mere reflex habits but trained abilities and bents, tendencies, liabilities or inhibitions. Human knowing is more an intending of facts or states of affairs than a relation to them. Knowledge is not a predicamental relation. Consciousness is related to its object not as North Pole to South Pole, nor as container to contained, but as matter to form, and to the physical form (...) of the object of consciousness there corresponds the intentional form of the consciousness itself. To know reality is not to acquire it, grasp it, have it, possess it, contemplate it or dwell in it; it is to be informed by it i.e. intentionally to become it. Knowledge is the form rather than the cause of rational behaviour: technique, method, knack, skill, expertise, know-how, flair, strategic sense, prudence, taste, discretion, caution, judiciousness, decorum, conscientiousness, style, discipline, sagacity, discrimination, wisdom, respect for sense. Such principles operate not by description of nor prescription for, but by incarnation in and information of performance. It is, for instance, man’s respect for sense that is the form of a logically clear expression, and ideas are skills in the use of words. This human capacity and achievement is an intentional becoming, an actuation of the subject, bringing him to act. Yet, properly speaking, it is not action but passion. For knowing is an effect of which reality is the cause, and this causality is not a relation: actio est in passo—not in the agent, nor between the agent and the patient, but in the patient as from the agent, an actuation of the subject in dependence on the object. Of course it may be argued that non datur actio in distans, but far from requiring some intellectual ether, this only means that action and passion are not candidates for the application of spatial or temporal predicates. The known need not be close to the knower. True knowledge is the form of our reason when it is truly about matters of fact. It is not, then, a relation between subject and object, but a knowledge of states of affairs or facts constituted by interrelated objects which, to be known, must comprise some states of affairs of whose constituent objects some, at least, are knowing subjects. Inquiry is related to insight as searching to finding, or as trying to succeeding. Knowing is the second act or actualization of the intellect Thomists regard as second potency, first act, or accidental passive potency. But knowing is not a transitive activity. It is an achievement of intention, not an episode. It is a capacity, disposition, proneness or inclination, in so far as it connotes the abiding possibility of its contents’ polymorphic propositional and non-propositional expression in rational behaviour, which is an effect of knowing as an achievement, though it is also rightly said to be informed by know-how rather than caused by it. The act of self-knowledge consciously intends the self, but the self is intended as known and not as conscious. Thus, though true of consciousness, the distinction between consciously judging and consciously being tickled is not in consciousness but in knowledge of consciousness. Knowledge should be studied not in its products, but in its various expressions, especially in linguistic ones. For words and sentences are the most easily inspected class of things that we think in. (shrink)

For some time now, Aristotle’s ethics – to be exact: the Nicomachean Ethics – have influenced or inspired a considerable array of theoretical options in contemporary moral philosophy. As a result, Aristotle’s ethical works have assumed a dignified systematic place next to such modern strains as the consequentialist, utilitarian or deontological ones. The precise relation of Aristotle’s ethics to these modern theories remains ambiguous, however : depending upon the particular systematic intere...

The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce spent most of his life as a private scholar in Naples. His Estetica, which first appeared in 1902, has remained a seminal work not only for aesthetics but also for general linguistics. As the full title indicates, this is not a narrow work dealing with the theory of art and criticism. For Croce intended this to be the first part of his 'philosophy of the spirit' and he thus presents a systematic general theory intended to (...) solve all philosophical problems. The work presents an account of the structure of the human mind and shows how art arises naturally from that structure, as well as introducing the influential notion of the organic unity of a work of art. As a result, art is shown to be integral to any life and an essential aspect of what it is to be human. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper on the philosophical poetics of Descartes has the following sections:1. The paradox of philosophical creation.2. The place of Olympica in Descartes' work.3. The three dreams.4. Knowledge, dream and reality.5. Science, poetry and wisdom.6. Scholastic philosophy and poetical philosophy.7. The philosophical value of Descartes' dreams.8. The method of method.9. Who dreamed?

In this previously unpublished follow‐up to ‘Another Look at Colour’, McGinn evaluates a possible objection to the account developed there. In McGinn's view, ‘colours are simple monadic primitive properties whose instantiation supervenes on complex relational dispositions to appear to perceivers in such‐and‐such ways’. According to the objection, the phenomenology of colour experience is wholly uninformative with respect to the ontological nature of colour ; thus, for instance, the question of whether colours are identical to, or rather supervene on, dispositions need (...) not arise. McGinn argues against the neutrality thesis, ultimately defending a kind of externalism about perceptual content, according to which ‘visual experience is a relation between a conscious subject and a cluster of properties, which may or may not be instantiated’. McGinn concludes by criticizing McDowell's neo‐Kantian view of perceptual appearance. (shrink)

The field of neuroimaging has reached a watershed. Brain imaging research has been the source of many advances in cognitive neuroscience and cognitive science over the last decade, but recent critiques and emerging trends are raising foundational issues of methodology, measurement, and theory. Indeed, concerns over interpretation of brain maps have created serious controversies in social neuroscience, and, more important, point to a larger set of issues that lie at the heart of the entire brain mapping enterprise. In this volume, (...) leading scholars -- neuroimagers and philosophers of mind -- reexamine these central issues and explore current controversies that have arisen in cognitive science, cognitive neuroscience, computer science, and signal processing. The contributors address both statistical and dynamical analysis and modeling of neuroimaging data and interpretation, discussing localization, modularity, and neuroimagers' tacit assumptions about how these two phenomena are related; controversies over correlation of fMRI data and social attributions ; and the standard inferential design approach in neuroimaging. Finally, the contributors take a more philosophical perspective, considering the nature of measurement in brain imaging, and offer a framework for novel neuroimaging data structures. Contributors: William Bechtel, Bharat Biswal, Matthew Brett, Martin Bunzl, Max Coltheart, Karl J. Friston, Joy J. Geng, Clark Glymour, Kalanit Grill-Spector, Stephen José Hanson, Trevor Harley, Gilbert Harman, James V. Haxby, Rik N. Henson, Nancy Kanwisher, Colin Klein, Richard Loosemore, Sébastien Meriaux, Chris Mole, Jeanette A. Mumford, Russell A. Poldrack, Jean-Baptiste Poline, Richard C. Richardson, Alexis Roche, Adina L. Roskies, Pia Rotshtein, Rebecca Saxe, Philipp Sterzer, Bertrand Thirion, Edward Vul The hardcover edition does not include a dust jacket. (shrink)

Depuis des millénaires, surtout depuis l'avènement de l'écriture, l'homme connaît la vie à travers des mots et des idées qui l'interprètent et lui renvoient une image faussée de lui- même. Nous oublions que l'homme n'existerait pas s'il n'était pas préalablement de la matière. Les idées ne sont qu'une sécrétion de son cerveau et si Socrate craignait de perdre la vue en regardant le monde, nous avons perdu le sens du réel en reniant notre corps. Est-il possible de lui permettre de (...) se faire entendre? Redonner la parole à la matière que notre forme manifeste est encore possible, même si cela dérange ceux qui ont pris le pouvoir à l'aide de la pensée, que ce soit sur le plan politique ou le plan religieux. L'expérience montre que c'est faisable. (shrink)